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I. INTRODUCTION 
Gender-based crimes were rampant during the decade-long armed 
conflict in Sierra Leone.  Crimes of sexual violence such as rape, sexual 
mutilation, and sexual slavery were committed.1  There were also crimes 
targeted against individuals based on gender, including the forced 
recruitment of boys and men into fighting forces or diamond mining, and 
the forced marriage of girls and women to combatants.2  The Special Court 
                                                           
 *  Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario (Canada). 
 1. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY”: SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE IN THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT 25-50 (2003), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sierleon0103.pdf (reporting acts of sexual 
violence by all actors in the conflict, including rape, rape with objects such as weapons 
or burning wood, “virgination” of young girls, sexual mutilation, forced pregnancies, 
forced abortion, and sexual slavery); PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WAR-RELATED 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN SIERRA LEONE: A POPULATION-BASED ASSESSMENT 2-4 (2000) 
(deducing from study data that approximately 50,000 to 64,000 internally displaced 
women in Sierra Leone may have been victims of sexual violence, including rape (89% 
of study participants), gang rape (33% of study participants), sexual slavery (15% of 
study participants), and several other crimes that occurred mostly between 1997 and 
1999). 
 2. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 42-43 (noting that rebel forces 
used abduction as a means of recruiting by forcibly conscripting boys and men in 
towns the rebel forces attacked, and that abducted women became sexual slaves and 
were forced to perform slave labor); SUSAN MCKAY & DYAN MAZURANA, WHERE ARE 
THE GIRLS? GIRLS IN FIGHTING FORCES IN NORTHERN UGANDA, SIERRA LEONE AND 
MOZAMBIQUE: THEIR LIVES DURING AND AFTER WAR 91-93 (2004) (observing that 
girls participated in fighting forces as cooks, porters, caretakers, laborers in diamond 
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for Sierra Leone was created in 2002 as a joint international-domestic effort 
to prosecute those bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes against 
humanity and war crimes committed during the conflict.3  Given the 
widespread nature of gender-based violations, it was likely that the Special 
Court’s trials would explore the accountability of individuals for these 
crimes.4  Thus, the Prosecutor of the Special Court made the prosecution of 
gender-based crimes a priority.  As a result, ten out of the thirteen accused 
from the Sierra Leone conflict were charged with the crimes against 
humanity of rape and sexual slavery, and the war crime of outrages upon 
personal dignity.5  Six of the accused were also charged with forced 
marriage under the heading of the crime against humanity of other 
                                                           
mines, and as “wives” of combatants). 
 3. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone 
on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 
U.N.T.S. 138, at 138. 
 4. However, it was not a foregone conclusion—other international criminal 
tribunals have had spotty records with respect to the prosecution of gender-based 
crimes, even when the conflicts under their mandate were rife with such crimes.  See, 
e.g., BINAIFER NOWROJEE, “YOUR JUSTICE IS TOO SLOW”: WILL THE ICTR FAIL 
RWANDA’S RAPE VICTIMS? 6, 9 (criticizing the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda’s (ICTR) sexual violence prosecution record, noting that because the 
Prosecutor’s Office lacked a comprehensive strategy for prosecuting sexual crimes, no 
rape charges were brought in 90% of the cases, and 20% of the cases resulted in 
acquittals because the Prosecutor’s Office failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable 
doubt). 
 5. The ten charged with these crimes included Charles Taylor, three Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) accused, three Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) accused, Sam Bockarie, Johnny Paul Koroma, and Foday Sankoh.  The 
indictments against Bockarie and Sankoh were later withdrawn due to their deaths.  See 
Prosecutor v. Bockarie, Case No. SCSL-03-04-I, Indictment, ¶¶ 33, 41-45 
(Mar. 7, 2003) (charging Sam Bockarie with rape, sexual slavery and any other form of 
sexual violence, and outrages upon personal dignity) withdrawn, Case No. SCSL 03-
04-I-022, Withdrawal of Indictment (Dec. 8, 2003) (withdrawing Bockarie’s indictment 
due to his death).  The original indictment noted that 
the AFRC/RUF routinely captured and abducted members of the civilian 
population.  Captured women and girls were raped; many of them were 
abducted and used as sex slaves and as forced labour.  Some of these women 
and girls were held captive for years.  Men and boys who were abducted were 
also used as forced labour [and held captive] . . . .  AFRC/RUF also physically 
mutilated men, women and children, including amputating their hands or feet 
and carving ‘AFRC’ and ‘RUF’ on their bodies. 
Id. ¶ 33.  See Prosecutor v. Koroma, Case No. SCSL-03-03-I, Indictment, ¶¶ 39-43 
(Mar. 7, 2003) (charging Koroma with the same sexual violence crimes as charged 
against Bockarie); Prosecutor v. Sankoh, Case No. SCSL-03-02-I, Indictment, ¶¶ 42-46 
(Mar. 7, 2003) (charging Sankoh with the same sexual violence crimes as charged 
against Bockarie); see also Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, 
Prosecution’s Second Amended Indictment, Counts 4-6 and ¶¶ 14-17 (May 29, 2007) 
(detailing charges of rape, sexual slavery, and outrages upon personal dignity against 
Charles Taylor, including the rape of an unknown number of women and girls in Kono 
District, Kailahun District, and Freetown and the Western Area, as well as the 
abduction and forced sexual slavery of girls and women from these areas).  The 
Prosecutor tried to amend the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) indictment to include 
similar charges, but was unsuccessful.  See Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, 
Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the 
Indictment, ¶ 6 (May 20, 2004) (describing the Prosecution’s proposed amendment to 
the original indictment adding counts of rape, sexual slavery, other inhumane acts like 
forced marriages, and outrages upon personal dignity).  The Norman decision is 
examined in more detail in Parts IV and V, infra. 
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inhumane acts.6 
In 2007 and 2008, the Special Court issued its first two trial-level and 
first two appellate-level judgments in what are popularly known as the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Civil Defence Forces 
(CDF) cases.7  A number of important lessons on the prosecution of 
gender-based violations can be drawn from these judgments and this 
Article explores each of the lessons in turn.  The first lesson from the 
Special Court’s judgments to date is that seemingly gender-neutral crimes 
may in fact contain gendered elements.  Gendered crimes may be 
multilayered and complex, and may include both sexual and non-sexual 
aspects.  This lesson emerges most noticeably from the AFRC trial and 
appeals judgments.  In Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, the Court 
explored the nature of the crime against humanity of forced marriage as an 
inhumane act.8  A majority of the Trial Chamber equated forced marriage 
with sexual slavery, thereby categorizing forced marriage solely as a crime 
of sexual violence.9  On appeal, the Appeals Chamber corrected this 
misperception, characterizing forced marriage as a crime distinct from 
sexual slavery because it is a “forced conjugal association with another 
person resulting in great suffering, or serious physical or mental injury.”10 
The second lesson relates to evidence.  At the trial level in the CDF case, 
the Trial Chamber rejected the Prosecutor’s initial request to amend the 
joint indictment to include certain gender-based crimes, and a subsequent 
request to consider evidence of gender-based acts as proof of either the 
crime against humanity of other inhumane acts or the war crime of cruel 
treatment.11  The dissenting justice and the Appeals Chamber both raised 
important evidentiary issues to challenge the Trial Chamber’s decisions, 
                                                           
 6. The AFRC accused and the three RUF accused were charged with forced 
marriage.  See Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, 
Corrected Amended Consolidated Indictment, ¶¶ 54-60 (Aug. 2, 2006) (charging the 
RUF members with rape, sexual slavery and any other form of sexual violence, and 
other inhumane acts, specifically forced marriages where the “‘wives’ were forced to 
perform a number of conjugal duties under coercion by their ‘husbands’”); Prosecutor 
v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Further Amended Consolidated 
Indictment, ¶¶ 51-57 (Feb. 18, 2005) (charging the three members of the AFRC with 
rape, sexual slavery and any other form of sexual violence, and other inhumane acts, 
specifically forced marriages with members of the AFRC). 
 7. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment 
(May 28, 2008); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, 
Appeals Judgment (Feb. 22, 2008); Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-
04-14-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (Aug. 2, 2007); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & 
Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment (June 20, 2007). 
 8. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 701-704. 
 9. See id. ¶ 704 (finding that the Prosecution failed to establish the elements of 
“forced marriage” as a crime independent of the crime of sexual slavery). 
 10. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 195. 
 11. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for 
Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶¶ 82-87 (dismissing the motion to amend the 
Indictment as untimely, although noting that “[t]he Chamber is preeminently conscious 
of the importance that gender crimes occupy in international criminal justice given the 
very high casualty rates of females in sexual and other brutal gender-related abuses 
during internal and international conflicts”). 
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noting that the circumstances surrounding the collection of evidence of 
gender-based violations may differ from the circumstances relating t  other 
crimes, and that evidence of gender-based violations is not inherently more 
prejudicial than other kinds of evidence.12 
The final lesson relates to how the Court’s mandate to address gender-
based crimes is connected with the rights of the accused.  This lesson is 
most evident in the CDF case, in which a majority of the trial judges failed 
to bear in mind the Prosecutor and Court’s obligations to consider gender-
based crimes with the defendants’ rights to be tried without undue delay 
and to have adequate time to prepare a case.  On appeal, Justice Winter 
convincingly concluded in her dissent that the majority trial judges should 
have considered several other important factors: the scope and nature of the 
amendments, the consequences of admittance or denial of amendments on 
the trial proceedings, the fairness of the proceedings to both the defense 
and prosecution, whether denial of the amendments would impede the 
Special Court’s fulfillment of its mandate, and whether victims would be 
provided with proper access to justice.13  In other words, the majority trial 
judges should have balanced the rights of the accused with these other 
relevant matters. 
It may seem that some of these lessons are obvious.  For example, the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
Rwanda (ICTR) have considered evidence of gender-based acts under the 
heading of crimes such as torture, inhumane acts and enslavement.14  These 
tribunals have also recognized the difficulties of collecting evidence of 
gender-based violations.15  Even though the ICTY and ICTR explored these 
issues prior to the Special Court’s consideration in the AFRC and CDF 
cases, it is important to note that the Special Court has confirmed that these 
approaches are correct.  The Special Court’s reasoning creates internal 
precedent for the remaining Special Court cases and, more generally, 
strengthens accepted practice within international criminal law.  The 
Special Court has also analyzed gender issues not yet examined by the 
                                                           
 12. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeal Judgment, sec. VII, ¶¶ 80-85 
(Winter, J., partially dissenting opinion) (finding that the trial court erred by dismissing 
the prosecution’s motion to amend the indictment because it is extremely difficult to 
obtain evidence of gender-based sexual crimes and that allowing the prosecution to 
temporally and geographically expand their investigation would not have compromised 
the defendants’ rights). 
 13. See id. ¶¶ 82-86 (finding error with the Trial Chamber’s reluctance to admit 
evidence of sexual violence because the allegations were not specifically pleaded in the 
Indictment, noting that the accused had sufficient notice that evidence of gender-based 
sexually violent crimes such that it could be admitted under counts 3 and 4 of the 
Indictment, and that the Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief clearly noted evidence of rape 
and sexual slavery). 
 14. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, 
¶ 745 (Feb. 22, 2001); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 
¶ 267 (Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 
¶ 697 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 15. E.g., Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 417, 455 (discussing the 
effect of sexual violence trauma on memory). 
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ICTY or ICTR.16  The Special Court’s judgments to date demonstrate that 
there is more work to do within international criminal law on the analysis 
of gender-based violations, even though there has been much progress in 
this field over the last fifteen years. 
II. THE AFRC AND CDF ACCUSED 
The conflict in Sierra Leone is widely recognized to have begun in 
March 1991 with an attack in the Kailahun District by the rebel 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces led by a former soldier of the 
Sierra Leone Army, Foday Sankoh.17  RUF forces controlled large parts of 
Sierra Leone, especially in the northern regions, by 1995.18  This success 
prompted the emergence of local militias, primarily consisting of 
traditional hunters, who fought on behalf of the government and became 
known as the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).19  The CDF collaborated with 
the fighting forces of the Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group, or ECOMOG.20  Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, leader of the 
Sierra Leone People’s Party, won the March 1996 Sierra Leone presidential 
elections.21  In May 1997, junior members of the Sierra Leone Army seized 
power from the Kabbah government because they believed the government 
favored the CDF over the Army.22  They formed a new government called 
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), headed by Johnny Paul 
Koroma23 who invited the RUF to join the AFRC.24  The AFRC and RUF 
fought together to gain control over parts of Sierra Leone controlled by the 
CDF as well as to control diamond mining.25  Over time, however, relations 
between the AFRC and RUF deteriorated and the Kabbah government was 
                                                           
 16. For example, the Special Court has studied forced marriage and concluded that 
it is different from sexual slavery.  See, e.g., Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, 
Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶¶ 8, 10, 52 
(May 6, 2004).  In Brima, the Prosecution requested to amend the Indictment with 
specific references to forced marriage. It submitted to the court an “Investigator’s 
Statement” that explained “that the crimes of sexual violence are not simply sexual 
slavery but are most appropriately characterized as ‘forced marriages.’  [The 
Investigator] state[d] that new investigations have ‘clarified’ the nature of the 
relationships.”  Id.  Ultimately, the court allowed the additional count of forced 
marriage, viewing it as a “kindred offense” and concluded that the defense was already 
on notice.  Id. 
 17. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 4. 
 18. See id. (describing how RUF consolidated its territorial control to seize 
nationwide power). 
 19. See id. 
 20. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 8-9. 
 21. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 5 (discussing 
how government support for the CDF spurred a failed coup d’état by Johnny Paul 
Koroma, who was imprisoned following the attempt). 
 22. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 164. 
 23. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 7 (finding that 
this coup placed Koroma in power after freeing him from prison and suspending Sierra 
Leone’s constitution). 
 24. See id. 
 25. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 166-172. 
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reinstated in March 1998.26  The period that followed, including the 
AFRC’s invasion of Freetown in early 1999, was marked by widespread 
and brutal atrocities.27  The AFRC eventually divided into two groups in 
April 1999: the first group included the “West Side Boys,” who attacked 
the civilian population in the Port Loko District; and the second group 
included supporters of an RUF faction.  In July 1999, Kabbah’s 
government signed the Lomé Peace Accord with the RUF, but hostilities 
did not officially end until January 2002.28 
Indictments against AFRC leaders Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy 
Kamara, and Santigie Borbor Kanu were approved on March 7, May 28, 
and September 16, 2003 respectively.29  The indictments were later 
consolidated and amended.30  The amended consolidated indictment 
charged Brima, Kamara, and Kanu with seven counts of crimes against 
humanity, including rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage (as a 
separate inhumane act); six counts of violations of article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions; and one count of a serious violation of international 
humanitarian law, namely the conscription, enlistment, or use of child 
soldiers.31  Brima was arrested on March 10, Kamara on May 29, and Kanu 
on September 17, 2003.32  Their joint trial began on March 7, 2005 and 
concluded on December 8, 2006.33  The trial judgment was issued on June 
20, 2007,34 and was followed by an appeals judgment on 
February 22, 2008.35  Details relating to gender issues raised in these 
judgments are examined in Section III of this Article. 
Three individuals within the CDF were indicted by the Prosecutor of the 
Special Court: Sam Hinga Norman was the CDF’s “National Coordinator,” 
                                                           
 26. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 10. 
 27. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 173-207 (claiming that 
attacks on Freetown continued after the AFRC signed the Conakry Accord in October 
1997). 
 28. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 12. 
 29. Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2003-06-I, Indictment (Mar. 7, 2003); 
Prosecutor v. Brima, SCSL-2003-06-I, Decision Approving the Indictment and Order 
for Non-Disclosure (Mar. 7, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kamara, Case No. SCSL-2003-10-I, 
Indictment (May 28, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kamara, SCSL-2003-10-I, Decision 
Approving the Indictment, the Warrant of Arrest, and Order for Non-Disclosure 
(May 28, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2003-13-I, Indictment (Sept. 15, 
2003); Prosecutor v. Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2003-13-I, Decision Approving the 
Indictment, the Warrant of Arrest and Order for Transfer and Detention, and Order for 
Non-Public Disclosure (Sept. 16, 2003).  An indictment was also issued for Johnny 
Paul Koroma, Prosecutor v. Koroma, Case No. SCSL-2003-03-I, Indictment (Mar. 7, 
2003). However, Koroma is presumed dead.  See, e.g., War Crime Court Probes Death 
Reports, BBC NEWS, June 16, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2992462.stm 
(last visited May 21, 2009). 
 30. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16 PT, Further Amended Consolidated 
Indictment. 
 31. See id. ¶¶ 41-79. 
 32. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, at Annex A: Procedural 
History, ¶¶ 1-3. 
 33. See id. ¶¶ 58, 62. 
 34. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment. 
 35. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment. 
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Moinina Fofana was the “Director of War,” and Allieu Kondewa was the 
“High Priest.”36  The original indictment against Norman was approved on 
March 7 and indictments against Fofana and Kondewa were approved on 
June 24, 2003.37  The three indictments were later consolidated into a single 
indictment on February 5, 2004.38  Norman, Kondewa, and Fofana were 
charged with two counts of crimes against humanity, five counts of 
violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of 
Additional Protocol II, and one count of a serious violation of international 
humanitarian law.39  Norman was arrested on March 10 and Kondewa and 
Fofana were arrested on May 29, 2003.40  Their joint trial commenced on 
June 3, 2004 and was completed on November 29, 2006.  Norman died in 
February 2007, prior to the release of the trial judgment,41 and proceedings 
against him were thereafter terminated.42  The trial judgment against 
Kondewa and Fofana was issued on August 2, 200743 and the appeals 
judgment on May 28, 2008.44  The gender-related aspects of these 
judgments are discussed below in Parts IV and V. 
III. LESSON ONE: GENDERED CRIMES MAY BE COMPLEX AND SEEMINGLY 
GENDER-NEUTRAL CRIMES MAY CONTAIN GENDERED ELEMENTS 
In the AFRC case, all three accused were charged with the crimes 
against humanity of rape, sexual slavery, and any other form of sexual 
violence, and forced marriage under the category of “other inhumane acts” 
as well as the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity.45  Forced 
marriage refers to the practice during the Sierra Leonean conflict of 
assigning abducted girls and women to combatants as “wives.”  These 
                                                           
 36. See Prosecuter v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 1. 
 37. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-03-11-I, Indictment (June 24, 2003); 
Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-03-12-I, Indictment, (June 24, 2003); 
Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-03-08-I, Indictment (Mar. 7, 2003). 
 38. Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-03-14-I, 
Indictment (Feb. 5, 2004) 
 39. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-03-14-I, Indictment, ¶¶ 1-8 (Feb. 5, 2004). 
 40. See Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment on 
the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, ¶ 1 (Oct. 9, 2007) (noting that 
the accused persons were arrested for allegedly committing crimes against humanity 
and other serious offenses as defined by the Special Court for Sierra Leone); see also 
Press Release, David M. Crane, Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone (Mar. 10, 
2003), available at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/WhatHappening/Press 
ReleaseOTP.html (announcing the arrest of Norman for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and violations of international humanitarian law). 
 41. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment ¶ 4 (stating that Norman died 
in the hospital after completion of the trial). 
 42. See id. ¶ 5 (noting that the judgment in relation to the two remaining defendants 
was based on the evidence of record submitted by all original parties). 
 43. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment (Aug. 2, 2007). 
 44. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals 
Judgment, (May 28, 2008). 
 45. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Further Amended Consolidated 
Indictment, ¶¶ 51-57 (discussing the widespread sexual violence committed against 
civilian women and girls, including rapes involving multiple rapists and abductions of 
groups of civilian women for the purpose of sexual slavery). 
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“wives” were often raped by their “husbands” and were sometimes forced 
to bear and rear resulting children.  “Wives” were also usually forced to 
undertake domestic labor such as cleaning, cooking, and laundry.46  They 
were also expected to protect the property of their “husband” and to move 
his possessions as needed.47  As a result of the violence they suffered, some 
of these “wives” contracted sexually transmitted diseases or HIV.48  Thus, 
forced marriage is a type of gender-based crime with sexual and numerous 
non-sexual aspects. 
However, it was not understood in this way by a majority of the Trial 
Chamber in the AFRC case.  The majority held that “the Prosecution 
evidence in the present case does not point to even one instance of a 
woman or girl having had a bogus marriage forced upon her in 
circumstances which did not amount to sexual slavery.”49  According to the 
majority, one must subtract the sexual aspects of the forced marriage 
evidence (as these go to proof of sexual slavery) and the remaining non-
sexual aspects (presumably the forced domestic labor, physical abuse, and 
forced child-bearing and child-rearing) do not reach the gravity required for 
“other inhumane acts.”50  Thus, the majority found that the evidence of 
forced marriage was subsumed by the crime against humanity of sexual 
slavery, and dismissed the forced marriage charges as redundant.51  The 
majority also dismissed the sexual slavery charges for duplicity, as the 
original charge was for “sexual slavery and any other form of sexual 
violence.”52  The majority then considered the evidence of sexual slavery 
under the war crimes charge of outrages upon personal dignity. 
The majority of the Trial Chamber viewed forced marriage as a sexual 
crime.  By focusing entirely on the sexual aspects of forced marriage, the 
majority focused too much on the sexual aspects of the crime and focused 
too little on the harm caused by the non-sexual aspects.  As a result, it did 
                                                           
 46. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 10 (June 20, 2007) 
(Sebutinde, J., concurring) (noting that stereotyped perceptions of women are 
exacerbated during wartime and put women at greater risk for abduction and violence). 
 47. Id. ¶ 14; see also id. ¶ 31 (Doherty, J., dissenting) (stating that “bush wives” 
were also expected to gratify the sexual wishes of their husbands without question). 
 48. See id. ¶ 30 (Doherty, J., dissenting) (noting also that miscarriages were very 
common among “bush wives,” and medical attention was often limited or unavailable 
for such women). 
 49. Id. ¶ 710 (majority opinion) (noting that not one of the victims of sexual 
slavery had given evidence that their rebel captor’s declaration of marriage had caused 
any particular physical or mental trauma). 
 50. See id. ¶¶ 697, 703-704, 710 (arguing that such “inhumane acts” must include 
conduct that is not subsumed by other crimes in the Statute). 
 51. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 711, 714 (Sebutinde, J., 
concurring) (maintaining that the use of the term “wife” by rebel forces was used to 
show ownership over the victims rather than to establish a marital relationship with the 
victims). 
 52. See id. ¶¶ 93-95 (Doherty, J., dissenting) (arguing that the proper remedy was 
not to strike out the entire charge, but to sever “any other form of sexual violence” 
from that charge); see also Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment, 
¶¶ 99-110 (noting that the Appeals Chamber ruled that the sexual slavery charges 
should not have been dismissed). 
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not take into account the ongoing harm caused by the social stigma of 
having been a “wife.”53  In dissent, Justice Doherty disagreed with the 
majority’s approach.  She outlined a collection of harms that may be 
suffered by those who were forcibly married: abduction, repeated rape and 
ongoing sexual violence, resulting pregnancies, physical abuse, 
miscarriages, death threats, being forced to live with and be loyal to an 
individual the victim fears or despises, forced relocation with the 
“husband” as the troops moved, mental trauma, lasting stigma associated 
with being labeled a “wife,” and rejection by society, all of which may be 
compounded by the youth of the victim.54  Unlike the majority however, 
she did not focus on the sexual aspects of forced marriage.  Instead, she 
argued that the “crucial element of ‘forced marriage’ is the imposition, by 
threat or physical force arising from the perpetrator’s words or other 
conduct, of a forced conjugal association by the perpetrator over the 
victim.”55  She noted, however, that abduction, rape, and other acts may 
help to prove the lack of consent of the victim.56  She also pointed out that 
this definition of forced marriage meets the requirement of causing serious 
harm to the mental or physical health of the victim and therefore qualifies 
as an inhumane act as a crime against humanity.57 
The Appeals Chamber took a view similar to that of Justice Doherty.  It 
chided the Trial Chamber majority for characterizing forced marriage as a 
sexual crime: “no tribunal could reasonably have found that forced 
marriage was subsumed in the crime against humanity of sexual slavery.”58  
They involve different elements of crime, and “unlike sexual slavery, 
forced marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity between the ‘husband’ 
and ‘wife,’ which could lead to disciplinary consequences for breach of this 
                                                           
 53. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 16 (Sebutinde, J., 
concurring).  Justice Sebutinde demonstrated a somewhat more nuanced view than that 
expressed in the majority judgment, noting that “wives” were “forced to render gender-
specific forms of labour (conjugal duties) including cooking, cleaning, washing clothes 
or carrying loads for [the husband], for no genuine reward.”  Id.  She seemed to argue 
that these acts are proof of the element of sexual slavery requiring the exercise of 
powers attaching to the right of ownership, while the rape fulfilled another element, 
that of requiring the perpetrator to cause the victim to engage in sexual acts.  Id.  This is 
a narrow approach to forced marriage that views the gender-specific labor as a mode of 
proof of the sexual crimes and not as separate proof of harm. 
 54. See id. ¶¶ 37-50 (Doherty, J., dissenting) (detailing testimony from a variety of 
witnesses who had suffered abduction and forced marriage in Sierra Leone).  
Testimonies included accounts of sexual slavery, forced domestic labor (such as 
laundering, cooking, etc.), forced marriage, rape, and the status difference between 
“wives” of commanders and other abducted women.  Id. 
 55. See id. ¶ 53 (noting that such imposition of a forced conjugal relationship can 
result from the perpetrator’s words or conduct). 
 56. See id. ¶¶ 52, 70 (reiterating that the crime of “forced marriage” is “concerned 
primarily with the mental and moral suffering of the victim.”). 
 57. See id. ¶ 57 (asserting that the evidence presented met the legal threshold to 
constitute a “crime against humanity”). 
 58. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 195 (arguing that 
there are a number of distinguishing factors between forced marriage and sexual 
slavery, despite the fact that these categories share a common aspect of non-consensual 
sex). 
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exclusive arrangement.”59  The Appeals Chamber defined the crime in a 
slightly more expansive manner than Justice Doherty as 
a situation in which the perpetrator through his words or conduct, or 
those of someone for whose actions he is responsible, compels a person 
by force, threat of force, or coercion to serve as a conjugal partner 
resulting in severe suffering, or physical, mental or psychological injury 
to the victim.60 
This comparison of the reasoning of the Trial and Appeals Chambers’ 
rulings leads to the conclusion that judges (and prosecutors, defense 
lawyers and, in the International Criminal Court, victims’ counsel) must 
not jump to the conclusion that gender-based crimes are to be equated with 
the narrower category of crimes of sexual violence.  Gender-based crimes 
include crimes such as rape and sexual slavery, but the classification is 
much wider.  Forced marriage is one example of a gender-based crime that 
may have sexual aspects (for example, repeated rape), but also may have 
many non-sexual aspects (for example, forced child-bearing and child-
rearing, cooking and laundering).61  In other words, gender must be 
understood in all of its complexity.62  The understanding of gender must 
not be collapsed into that of sex.63 
                                                           
 59. See id. ¶ 195 (asserting that such distinctions imply that forced marriage is not 
a predominantly sexual crime in nature). 
 60. Id. ¶ 196 (noting that the Court’s definition refers explicitly to the concept of 
forced marriage within the specific context of the conflict in Sierra Leone). 
 61. See id. ¶ 52 (Doherty, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that “forced marriage” does 
not require proof of physical violence). 
 62. Gender has been defined by the United Nations Office of the Special Advisor 
on Gender Issues as 
the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and 
female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, 
as well as the relations between women and those between men.  These 
attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are 
learned through socialization processes.  They are context/time-specific 
and changeable.  Gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued 
in a women or a man in a given context.  In most societies there are 
differences and inequalities between women and men in responsibilities 
assigned, activities undertaken, access to and control over resources, as 
well as decision-making opportunities.  Gender is part of the broader 
socio-cultural context.  Other important criteria for socio-cultural analysis 
include class, race, poverty level, ethnic group and age. 
Office of The Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, Dep’t of 
Economic and Soc. Affairs, Concepts and Definitions, http://www.un.org/ 
womenwatch/osagi/conceptsandefinitions.htm (last visited May 21, 2009).  See Valerie 
Oosterveld, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Child Soldiers and Forced Marriage: 
Providing Clarity or Confusion?, 45 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 131-72 (2009) [hereinafter 
Oosterveld, Child Soldiers and Forced Marriage]; Valerie Oosterveld, The Special 
Court for Sierra Leone’s Consideration of Gender-Based Violence: Contributing to 
Transitional Justice?, 10 HUM. RTS. REV. 73-98 (2009) [hereinafter Oosterveld, 
Consideration of Gender-Based Violence]. 
 63. See Karen Engle, Feminism and its (Dis)Contents: Criminalizing Wartime 
Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 778, 815 (2005) (examining how 
the Office of the Prosecutor and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia emphasized ethnicity over gender as the motivating force behind the sexual 
violence, thereby placing men and women within the same standard, and raising the 
possibility that a gender-neutral approach could shift the focus from violence and 
“gender oppression” to sex); Katherine M. Franke, Gendered Subjects of Transitional 
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This author hopes that the International Criminal Court (ICC) will heed 
this lesson, as a comprehensive understanding of gender will assist 
prosecutors to better explain the harms suffered by certain victims, and this, 
in turn, will help judges to understand these harms in a wider context.  
Forced marriage of the kind discussed in the AFRC case has taken place in 
the conflict in northern Uganda by the Lord’s Resistance Army.64  The 
ICC’s Prosecutor has also referred to forced marriage in the conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.65  However, in this case the Prosecutor 
has chosen to charge only the sexual slavery aspect of forced marriage and 
not the other aspects.66  In the confirmation of charges hearing, he 
successfully used evidence of forced marriage to prove that there is 
sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that civilian 
women were subjected to the crime against humanity of sexual slavery.67  
The Pre-Trial Chamber seemed to adopt an approach similar to that of 
Justice Sebutinde in the AFRC case, using evidence of non-sexual acts 
such as abduction, imprisonment and forced cooking as proof of the 
exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership.68  Perhaps in future 
                                                           
Justice, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 813, 822-23 (2006). 
The reduction of gender to the sexual and the ignorance of how men can suffer 
gendered violence is, to be most generous, a form of overcompensation for the 
years of ignoring women’s place in humanitarian law . . . .  [T]o see the 
‘gender issue’ surface only in the case of sexual violence is to elide the 
gendered dimensions of war, violence, and the investment in killing over 
caring. 
Id. 
 64. See MCKAY & MAZURANA, supra note 2, at 73 (presenting data that shows that 
girls’ functions within the LRA were more complex than the original reports focusing 
on forced marriage and sexual slavery stated, and emphasizing that “72 percent 
reported receiving weapons and military training”); see also Prosecutor v. Kony, Case 
No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony Issued on 8 July 2005 as 
Amended on 27 September 2005, Counts 5 & 13 (Sept. 27, 2005) (noting that the 
International Criminal Court has issued warrants of arrest including reference to sexual 
slavery for Joseph Kony as the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army); ABDUCTED AND 
ABUSED: RENEWED CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA, 15 HUM. RTS. WATCH 12(A), 
July 2003, at 28-31 (describing forced marriage to LRA combatants resulting in rape, 
unwanted pregnancies, forced childbearing and childrearing, transmission of sexually 
transmitted diseases and HIV, and difficulties adjusting to post-LRA life). 
 65. See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, 
Prosecution’s Submission of Public Version of Document Containing the Charges, ¶ 89 
(Apr. 24, 2008) (maintaining that women who were captured and spared because they 
hid their ethnicity, were raped, forcibly taken to military camps and given as “wives” to 
their captors). 
 66. Id. at Count 7. 
 67. See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 353-354 (Sept. 30, 2008) (examining the 
evidence presented by civilian women from Bogoro who were captured, raped and bore 
children by their captors). 
 68. See U.N. PREPARATORY COMM’N FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., REPORT OF THE 
PREPARATORY COMM’N FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., PART II: FINALIZED DRAFT TEXT OF 
THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, at 13 (Nov. 2, 2000).  
The ICC’s Elements of Crime delineates the following elements for the crime of sexual 
slavery: 
1. The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or 
bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar 
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cases the Prosecutor could instead charge all of the acts relating to forced 
marriage, and not only the sexual acts, in order to better capture the entire 
harm.69 
The next part of the first lesson relates to the fact that seemingly gender-
neutral crimes may include gendered elements.  A majority of the ARFC 
Trial Chamber and a majority of the CDF Trial Chamber both mistakenly 
concluded that acts of sexual violence should only be used to prove the 
crimes against humanity of “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence” under article 2(g) 
of the Special Court’s Statute.70  As mentioned earlier, in the AFRC case 
the Prosecutor argued that forced marriage could be considered under the 
crime against humanity of “other inhumane acts,” but the Trial Chamber 
majority disagreed.71  The Appeals Chamber corrected this 
misapprehension, noting that the ICTY and ICTR have recognized a wide 
range of sexual and other gender-based acts as inhumane acts, and that 
there is no reason why the listing of sexual violence crimes in article 2(g) 
should foreclose the possibility of charging as inhumane acts crimes which 
may have a sexual or gender component.72 
A similar conclusion emerged in the CDF appeals judgment.  During the 
CDF trial, the Prosecutor brought a motion to determine admissibility of 
acts of sexual violence73 as evidence of the crime against humanity of other 
                                                           
deprivation of liberty. 
2. The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts 
of a sexual nature. 
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population. 
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to 
be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population. 
Id. 
 69. This could be done through the charge of inhumane acts as a crime against 
humanity, as was done in the Special Court, or by coupling charges of the crimes 
against humanity of enslavement and sexual slavery.  Another option, where warranted, 
is to charge forced marriage as the crime against humanity of gender-based 
persecution. 
 70. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 2(g), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 
U.N.T.S. 145. 
 71. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 703-707, 710 (arguing for a 
restrictive interpretation that the residual nature of “other inhumane acts” indicates that 
evidence of a sexual nature could only be considered under the sexual slavery charge, 
and that remaining evidence of forced marriage was not of sufficient gravity to qualify 
as an “inhumane act”). 
 72. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 184-186 (asserting 
that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that Article 2(i) of the Statute excludes sexual 
crimes and indicating that the statute must be interpreted expansively to prevent the 
“imagination of future torturers” from getting around the crimes encompassed by the 
statute). 
 73. In pleadings and decisions, the Special Court’s Prosecutor and the trial judges 
tended to use the word “sexual” as if it is synonymous with “gender,” even where the 
word “gender” was more appropriate.  This Article uses the term “gender” where 
appropriate, except when quoting judicial decisions that use the term “sexual” even 
though the term “gender” should have been used.  See Prosecutor v. Fofana & 
Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, n.1294 (May 28, 2008) 
(Winter, J., dissenting).  Justice Winter noted that the prosecution used the term “sexual 
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inhumane acts (Count 3 of the Indictment) and the war crime of cruel 
treatment (Count 4).74  A majority of the Trial Chamber ruled that evidence 
of sexual violence was not admissible under either count.75  While the Trial 
and, therefore, Appeal Chambers’ consideration of this issue focused in 
large part on whether the Prosecutor could bring such evidence when it was 
not indicated in the Indictment, the Appeals Chamber, citing ICTY and 
ICTR jurisprudence, did note that sexual violence can indeed constitute an 
inhumane act as alleged in Count 3 and cruel treatment as alleged in 
Count 4.76  The lesson emerging from both cases, therefore, is that acts of 
gender-based violence can serve as evidence of crimes against humanity 
other than rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
and any other form of sexual violence, including seemingly gender-neutral 
crimes. 
IV. LESSON TWO: CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE MUST  
BE GENDER-SENSITIVE 
The second lesson learned from the Special Court’s judgments to date is 
that consideration of evidence must be gender-sensitive.  This lesson was 
most apparent in the CDF judgments, unfortunately because of the failure 
of a majority of the Trial Chamber to undertake gender-sensitive 
consideration of the evidence.  The first example explored under this lesson 
stems from Justice Itoe’s classification of evidence of gender-based crimes 
as prejudicial, and the second relates to the dismissal by the majority of the 
Prosecutor’s request to consider circumstances surrounding the collection 
of such evidence in the CDF case. 
The Prosecutor wished to introduce evidence of gender-based violence at 
trial in order to prove elements of the crime against humanity of inhumane 
acts and the war crime of cruel treatment.  Despite the existence of ICTY 
and ICTR case law in support of this argument, a majority of the Trial 
Chamber denied this request, with Justice Itoe stating that “gender 
evidence” amounts to “prejudicial evidence” because it is “of a nature [as] 
to cast a dark cloud of doubt on the image of innocence that the Accused 
                                                           
violence” in its Ground of Appeal, even though it was referring to forced marriage.  
Thus, she stated,  “[i]n view of this consideration, the term sexual violence will be 
referred to as ‘gender-based violence.’”  Id. 
 74. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, 
Decision on Urgent Prosecution Motion Filed 15 February 2005 for a Ruling on the 
Admissibility of Evidence, ¶¶ 1-3 (May 23, 2005). 
 75. See id. (denying the Prosecution’s motion to delimit the adduction of particular 
relevant and admissible evidence); Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case 
No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Reasoned Majority Decision on Prosecution Motion for a Ruling 
on the Admissibility of Evidence, ¶ 19 (May 24, 2005) (holding that allowing the 
admission of the evidence in question would prove unfair to the defendants and 
derogate their due process rights). 
 76. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 441-442 (opining 
that the failure of Counts 3 and 4 to explicitly list the sexual acts that might amount to 
“other inhumane acts” or “cruel treatment” does not mean that sexual violent acts could 
not act as proof “other inhumane acts” or “cruel treatment”; the absence of an explicit 
list was simply a defect of the indictment). 
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enjoys under the law until the contrary is proved.”77  He also argued that 
evidence of gender-based crimes 
has the potential of staining the mind of the Judge with an impression 
that adversely affects his clean conscience towards all parties, and 
particularly, the party who is the victim of that evidence [i.e. the 
accused] which is tendered, to the extent that it leaves in the mind of the 
Judge, an indelible scar of bias which could make him ill disposed to the 
cause of the victim of said evidence [the accused] as a result of which 
injustice could be occasioned to the party who after all, may be innocent 
or have a just cause, and who, but for the admission of that contested 
evidence, should ordinarily have had the benefit of the judicial balance 
tilting in his favour.78 
Justice Itoe concluded that the admission of evidence of sexual violence 
is “unfairly compromising of the interests and status of innocence of the 
good standing of the victim of such evidence [i.e. the accused].”79  In other 
words, Justice Itoe implies that evidence of gender-based crimes is more 
likely to impugn the reputation of the defendants than other kinds of 
evidence, and that this perceived harm to the accused should guide the 
justices.  Justice Boutet, in dissent, convincingly replied that “[e]vidence of 
acts of sexual violence are no different than evidence of any other act of 
violence for the purposes of constituting offences within Counts 3 and 4 of 
the Indictment and are not inherently prejudicial or inadmissible character 
evidence by virtue of their nature or characterization as ‘sexual.’”80 
On appeal, Fofana used Justice Itoe’s statements to argue against the 
Prosecutor’s position.81  In response, the Appeals Chamber followed the 
same line of argument as Justice Boutet and correctly held that “the right to 
a fair trial enshrined in Article 17 of the Statute cannot be violated by the 
introduction of evidence relevant to any allegation in the trial proceedings, 
regardless of the nature or severity of the evidence.”82  The Appeals 
                                                           
 77. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, 
Separate Concurring Opinion of Hon. Justice Benjamin Mutanga Itoe, Presiding Judge, 
on the Chamber Majority Decision on Prosecution Motion for a Ruling on the 
Admissibility of Evidence, ¶ 78 (May 24, 2005) (voicing the fear that evidence of 
gender-based crimes threatens the presumption of the defendants’ innocence). 
 78. See id. ¶ 64 (discussing the definition of prejudicial evidence, and focusing on 
the risk of prejudicing the judge toward the defendants). 
 79. See id. ¶ 65 (distinguishing prejudicial evidence from incriminating evidence 
by considering the probative value versus the potential for prejudice). 
 80. Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, 
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Pierre Boutet on Decision on Prosecution Motion for a 
Ruling on the Admissibility of Evidence, ¶¶ 26-33, 36 (May 24, 2005) (disagreeing 
with the majority’s refusal to grant the Prosecution’s request to amend the Indictment).  
Justice Boutet cited several documents to support his argument that the stigmatizing 
nature of gender-based crimes makes it particularly difficult to obtain the requisite 
evidence needed to sustain a conviction.  Boutet argued that the Prosecutor did not 
have enough evidence at the time of the original Indictment to charge the accused with 
gender-based crimes.  Id. 
 81. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 446 n.864 (noting 
that Fofana relied on Justice Itoe’s denial of the Prosecution’s request to amend the 
Indictment since the evidence would be too prejudicial). 
 82. See id. (concluding that the relevance of the evidence outweighed the potential 
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Chamber, therefore, clearly indicated that evidence of gender-based 
violence is not inherently more prejudicial than other kinds of evidence.  
This is an important, and rather basic, lesson that should be applied by all 
international and domestic tribunals prosecuting international crimes. 
Linked to this observation is the fact that the collection of evidence of 
gender-based violence may be conducted under different circumstances 
than the collection of other kinds of evidence, and that this difference 
should be taken into account when relevant.  In February 2004, prior to the 
start of trial, the Prosecutor sought leave to amend the CDF indictment to 
include four new charges: rape as a crime against humanity, sexual slavery 
and any other form of sexual violence as crimes against humanity, other 
inhumane acts (forced marriage) as a crime against humanity, and outrages 
upon personal dignity as a war crime.83  On May 20, 2004, a majority of the 
Trial Chamber denied the request on the basis that granting the amendment 
would prejudice the rights of the accused, violate their right to be tried 
without undue delay, and constitute an abuse of process.84  The majority 
rejected the Prosecutor’s argument that he could not have requested an 
amendment earlier because he did not have solid evidence of gender-based 
violence earlier.  The majority held that the Prosecutor was aware of 
indications of gender-based crimes in June 2003 and that it was therefore 
not timely to wait until February 2004 to submit the amendment request.85  
The majority judges characterized the amendment motion as a prosecutorial 
request for an exception to the general rules on timeliness for “gender 
offences and offenders.”86 
In dissent, Justice Boutet properly pointed out that the Prosecutor can 
only bring a charge forward when the evidence meets the test of 
“reasonable certainty of conviction,” which was only the case as of late 
November 2003, when the Prosecutor was assured of the full cooperation 
of witnesses willing to testify to gender-based violations.87  The Prosecutor 
                                                           
for prejudice, and that the defendants received sufficient notice as to the evidence 
introduced). 
 83. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, 
Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶ 6 (May 20, 
2004) (noting that on February 9, 2004, the Prosecution requested leave to add four 
new counts to the Indictment that directly address gender-based crimes). 
 84. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for 
Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶ 86 (denying the Prosecution’s motion to amend the 
indictment, stating that to allow such an amendment would unduly prejudice the 
defendants’ rights to a fair and expeditious trial, and fearing that such a result would 
work to bring the administration of justice into disrepute). 
 85. See id. ¶¶ 44, 55 (discussing the timing of the Prosecution’s decision to file a 
motion to amend the indictment and concluding that some of the evidence relied upon 
in the motion had long been in the Prosecution’s possession). 
 86. See id. ¶¶ 83-84 (observing that the rules governing gender offenses are no 
different from those of other offenses and that to sustain the motion would create an 
unwanted exception in the rules governing gender offenses). 
 87. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, 
Boutet Dissent, ¶¶ 24, 35 (maintaining that the Prosecutor must have sufficient, 
credible evidence before bringing charges, and that the prosecution filed its motion to 
amend the indictment without undue delay following the discovery of sufficient, 
credible evidence of gender-based violations). 
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should not be expected to request amendments before ensuring that the 
evidence is reliable. Referring to an impressive range of sources, Justice 
Boutet pointed out that it may take longer to secure evidence of gender-
based crimes (especially crimes of sexual violence) than other crimes.88  
Gender-based crimes, including rape, may have created psychological 
damage and the survivors often live in fear of being ostracized and isolated, 
or being the subject of reprisals.89  In Sierra Leone, myths about raped 
adolescent girls and women—that these girls and women may become 
barren, sexually obsessed, and unable to remain faithful to their 
husbands—may create barriers to evidence collection.90  On appeal, Justice 
Winter helpfully reiterated these factors.91  Thus, the test for timeliness in 
bringing additional charges must take into account general and country-
specific circumstances related to gender-based violence. 
The specific circumstances of evidence collection in any given case of 
gender-based violence must also be taken into account.  In the CDF case, 
the Prosecutor had an additional hurdle to overcome: the CDF were viewed 
by many as heroes, creating an additional level of reluctance in and risk to 
potential witnesses.92  Therefore, it took more time to identify and ensure 
protection for victims willing to testify.  The Prosecutor pointed out that 
“[i]n some circumstances, it was the existence of the Indictment and 
subsequent incarceration of the Accused that created the conditions for 
these potential witnesses to come forward and to give evidence whereas 
before they were unwilling to do so.”93  While the majority of the Trial 
Chamber ignored this reality, it is an important factor that should have been 
weighed when evaluating the timeliness of the Prosecutor’s request for 
amendment. 
                                                           
 88. See id. ¶¶ 26-33 (discussing the variety of social pressures and potential for 
stigma that often lead to the reluctance of victims of sexual violence to come forward 
or testify). 
 89. See id. (highlighting the far-reaching consequences of systematic sexual 
violence on a victim beyond the actual perpetrated act and noting the damage done not 
only to the individual victim, but also the fear engendered in the community as a 
whole). 
 90. See id. ¶ 30 (pointing out that many societies tend to blame victims of sexual 
violence, thereby reinforcing victims’ feelings of shame, guilt, loneliness, and 
depression). 
 91. See Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals 
Judgment, ¶ 79 (May 28, 2008) (Winters, J., partially dissenting) (reiterating the 
inadequacy of evidence simply indicating gender-based crimes and the importance of 
the Prosecution waiting to file a motion to amend until they have sufficient material 
facts to sustain a prima facie case). 
 92. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, 
Majority Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for Leave to File an Interlocutory 
Appeal against the Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for Leave to Amend the 
Indictment against Samuel Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, ¶ 8 
(Aug. 2, 2004) (discussing the Prosecution’s arguments against the contention made by 
the court that the need for the amendment was based on a lack of due diligence on the 
part of the Prosecution). 
 93. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment (Partially Dissenting 
Opinion of Honourable Justice Renate Winters), ¶ 79 (noting the difficulty of getting 
victims of gender-based offences to come forward and accepting the Prosecution’s 
explanation as to why the motion to amend the indictment did not come sooner). 
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In sum, the second lesson is that a gender-sensitive trial requires gender-
sensitive consideration of evidence.  This did not happen in the CDF trial 
for a number of reasons: the majority judges improperly prospectively 
denied the introduction of evidence of gender-based crimes; one of the 
majority judges improperly viewed such evidence as inherently prejudicial; 
and the majority judges improperly excluded from their evaluation of 
timeliness consideration of the circumstances surrounding the collection of 
evidence of gender-based crimes.94  These mistakes should not be repeated 
at the Special Court or any other international criminal tribunal. 
V. LESSON THREE: JUDICIAL BALANCING IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE 
GENDER-SENSITIVE PROSECUTIONS 
The Special Court’s CDF case serves to illustrate the third lesson that it 
is relevant for judges to consider gender-related issues as part of a rights 
balancing exercise.  This lesson stems from a series of motions decisions 
that had a profoundly negative impact on the outcome of the CDF trial 
judgment.  As mentioned earlier, on February 9, 2004, the Prosecutor 
sought leave to amend the CDF indictment to include charges relating to 
the crimes against humanity of rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage 
(as an inhumane act), and the war crime of outrages upon personal 
dignity.95  This request was made prior to the assignment of the trial date.  
Similar requests to add these crimes to the AFRC and RUF indictments had 
been approved.96  On May 20, 2004, just prior to the beginning of the 
trial,97 a majority of the Trial Chamber rejected this request in a poorly 
written and confusing decision.98  The majority held that the Prosecutor 
brought the request after undue delay and that granting the request might 
require an unreasonable delay in the trial in order to allow the accused to 
prepare defenses to the new charges.99  In determining what constitutes an 
                                                           
 94. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. 
 95. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for 
Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶ 6. 
 96. See Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No.SCSL-04-15-PT, Decision 
on Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶¶ 25-28 (May 6, 2004) 
(finding that in the overall interest of justice, indictments may be amended, the crucial 
consideration being timing on the part of the prosecution); see also Prosecutor v. 
Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request 
for Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶ 57 (May 6, 2004) (citing precedent from other 
International Criminal Tribunals, the court held that where the Prosecution seeks to add 
only one count that expands on the existing indictment, the amendment does not 
unfairly prejudice the rights of the defendants). 
 97. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Boutet Dissent, ¶ 6 (establishing the 
starting date of the CDF trial as June 3, 2004). 
 98. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for 
Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶¶ 42, 48-86 (arguing that the Prosecution waited too 
long to amend the indictment, and that the delay was undue). 
 99. See id. ¶¶ 43, 49, 55, 63 (criticizing the prosecution for what the court felt 
amounted to a prosecutorial strategy relying on delay); Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-
14-PT, Boutet Dissent, ¶¶ 6, 37-48.  In his dissent, Justice Boutet pointed out that the 
case was being heard one month on and one month off, therefore no delay would occur 
as the defense may be able to conduct any additional investigations during the months 
off.  He also pointed out that the Prosecutor only had “indications” of gender-based 
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undue or unreasonable delay, the majority judges put much emphasis on 
the Special Court’s time-limited existence, which in their view created “a 
much shorter time frame” for determinations of delay than might be the 
case in other courts.100  Thus, for the majority judges, “extreme 
expeditiousness” was the “watchword” of the trial (though the judges did 
not comment on their own three and a half month delay in deciding the 
motion) and the judges’ “permanent preoccupation” when determining the 
interests of justice.101  The majority entirely discounted the Prosecutor’s 
explanations as to why the motion was brought in February 2004, as well 
as the Prosecutor’s argument that he has a specific duty to prosecute 
gender-related crimes.102  Indeed, the majority seemed to imply that giving 
any weight to these arguments would create an unwarranted exception. 
[T]he rules relating to the detection and prosecution of [gender-based] 
offences are the same as those governing the other war crimes and 
international humanitarian offences, and must not constitute or give rise 
to any exceptions to the general rules that relate to the respect and 
protection of the interests of the Parties . . . and the overall interests of 
justice.103 
Justice Boutet wrote a strong dissent to the majority decision.104  In 
examining the nature of the offences, Justice Boutet correctly balanced the 
rights of the accused with the duty of the Prosecutor not to bring charges 
before he has evidence strong enough for a reasonable certainty of 
conviction. 
The Prosecutor unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal from the Trial 
Chamber, despite arguing that the decision rendered him unable to establish 
a complete and accurate historical record of the crimes committed during 
the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, failed to acknowledge the right of the 
victims to have crimes committed against them characterized as gender-
based crimes, and permitted impunity for these crimes.105  The end result 
                                                           
crimes, as opposed to solid evidence, as of June 2003.  Id. 
 100. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for 
Leave to Amend Indictment, ¶ 53 (highlighting the differences between an 
international tribunal and a municipal judiciary, noting both the limited duration of the 
tribunal, and the importance of the perception of its credibility). 
 101. See id. ¶¶ 53, 61 (discussing the judges’ desire to honor the mandate 
establishing their court, the decision contends that only by expediting the trial will 
justice be properly administered within judicial traditions and norms). 
 102. See id. ¶ 58 (arguing that the Prosecution’s attempt to amend the indictment 
violates the defendants’ right to be fairly and properly informed of the charges they 
face, and faulting the diligence of the Prosecution for not including the gender offences 
in the initial indictment). 
 103. See id. ¶ 83 (echoing the decision’s main point that the nature of the gender 
offences alone should not dictate whether the court sustains the motion to amend). 
 104. See supra Section IV for analysis of Justice Boutet’s understanding that the 
collection of evidence of gender-based crimes may be more difficult than the collection 
of evidence of other crimes, and that this fact is relevant to considering timeliness. 
 105. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Majority Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Application for Leave to File an Interlocutory Appeal, ¶¶ 4, 6 (arguing that without 
allowing the additional charges, many of the crimes committed during the armed 
conflict in Sierra Leone will go unpunished); Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Boutet 
Dissent, ¶ 27 (maintaining that the prosecution not only can, but further has a duty to, 
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was that no gender-based charges were considered by the CDF Trial 
Chamber and the trial judgment is consequently silent on these types of 
crimes. 
Following the issuance of the trial judgment, the Prosecutor asked the 
Appeals Chamber to consider whether the Trial Chamber’s denial of his 
request to amend the indictment represented an error in law, in fact or in 
procedure.106  As a pragmatic remedy, he requested that, if an error was 
found, the Appeals Chamber simply reverse the legal reasoning employed 
by the Trial Chamber and issue a declaration to this effect.107  The usual 
remedy would be a retrial, but a retrial is impractical as the Special Court is 
slated to close in mid 2010.108  The Appeals Chamber declined to consider 
the appeal, stating that to do so would only be an “academic exercise” 
given the remedy requested and the fact that the request does not relate to 
actual verdicts in the trial judgment.109 
In contrast, Justice Winter, in a convincing and well-argued dissent, 
considered the Prosecutor’s appeal.  She found that the Trial Chamber 
majority’s reasoning “contained both errors of law invalidating the decision 
and errors of fact which have occasioned a miscarriage of justice.”110  
Winter took the reasoning begun by Justice Boutet further.  She held that 
the Trial Chamber did not correctly balance the rights of the accused to be 
tried without undue delay and to have adequate time to prepare a defense 
with several factors: the scope and nature of the amendments;111 the 
consequences of admittance—and denial—of amendments on the trial 
proceedings;112 whether the amendments will help to ensure “that the real 
issues in the case will be determined”; the difference between the duty of 
the Prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the defense’s 
burden to show that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not shown; and 
                                                           
bring newly found charges); Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. 
SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on Prosecution Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision 
of 2 August 2004 Refusing Leave to File an Interlocutory Appeal, ¶ 44 (Jan. 17, 2005) 
(holding that the Prosecution’s attempt to appeal directly to the Appeals Chamber was 
not properly brought as the Appeals Chamber did not have jurisdiction to hear such an 
appeal). 
 106. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 410. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. ¶ 425; Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 68 (Winter, 
J., partially dissenting). 
 109. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 427; id. ¶ 73 
(Winter, J., partially dissenting) (noting that consideration of this ground of appeal is 
far from an academic exercise, considering that “refusing to address the merits of the 
Prosecution’s Ground of Appeal at the final stage permanently denies the Prosecution 
the opportunity to have the merits of its contentions adjudicated on appeal, which . . . 
denies it the right to a fair trial”). 
 110. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 65 (Winter, J., partially 
dissenting). 
 111. See id. ¶ 79 (Winter, J., partially dissenting) (including taking into account that 
“victims of gender-based violence generally express greater reluctance to report and 
testify on those events than victims of other crimes”). 
 112. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 427 (considering 
only the consequences of admittance of the amendments, and not the impact of denial). 
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the fairness of the proceedings to both the defense and prosecution (which 
“acts on behalf of and in the interest of the community, including the 
interest of the victims of the offence charged”).113  In Winter’s view, 
another crucial factor to consider is whether denial of the amendments 
would impede the Special Court’s fulfillment of its mandate, which 
includes the prosecution of gender-based crimes and providing victims with 
proper access to justice.114  She found that the decision of the Trial 
Chamber majority to deny the amendments did deny the ability of the 
Special Court to fulfill its mandate, which includes the prosecution of 
gender-based violence, and prevented—likely forever due to the impact of 
amnesty in the Lomé Peace Accord—victims of gender-based violence 
from seeing their case adjudicated before the Special Court.115 
Michelle Staggs Kelsall and Shanee Stepakoff have examined this last 
point in detail.  They studied the impact on the Prosecutor’s proposed 
victim-witnesses of the denial of the indictment amendment, and the 
subsequent, equally concerning refusal to allow the Prosecutor to use 
evidence of gender-based violence to prove other charges.116  They argue 
that the Trial Chamber majority should not only have considered the legal 
impact of the denial on the victims, as Justice Winter has advocated, but 
also the personal impact.117  The victims, who all had agreed to testify to 
various forms of gender-based violence before the Special Court, were 
silenced by the denial of the indictment amendment, which has led to 
lasting negative psychological effects.118  They conclude that the Trial 
Chamber “seemingly needed to balance the harm done to the victim-
witness in being precluded from giving evidence against the harm done to 
the accused in having the evidence heard.”119 
The third lesson learned from the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s trial 
and appellate judgments to date is found in the CDF dissents: judicial 
balancing is key to gender-sensitive justice.  Justice Boutet indicated that 
evidence of gender-based crimes may need to be considered in light of the 
difficulty of collecting such evidence.  Justice Winter outlined how the 
                                                           
 113. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 82-85 (Winter, J., 
partially dissenting); id. ¶¶ 79-80, 84 (pointing out several factual errors made by the 
Trial Chamber majority, as well as that their estimate of a two year delay was purely 
speculative); id. ¶ 85 (contending that the Trial Chamber majority should have 
considered “the impact on and significance of prosecuting the material facts alleged in 
the amended indictment” because “the denial of the amendments precluded that any of 
the gender-based violence allegedly committed against women and girls by the 
Kamajors/CDF during the armed conflict could be prosecuted”). 
 114. Id. ¶¶ 85-86. 
 115. Id. ¶ 86. 
 116. Michelle Staggs Kelsall & Shanee Stepakoff, “When We Wanted to Talk About 
Rape”: Silencing Sexual Violence at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 1 INT’L J. 
TRANSNAT’L JUST. 355, 355 (2007).  See also Oosterveld, Consideration of Gender-
Based Violence, supra note 62; Oosterveld, Child Soldiers and Forced Marriage, supra 
note 62. 
 117. Kelsall & Stepakoff, supra note 116, at 357, 373. 
 118. Id. at 373. 
 119. Id. at 366. 
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rights of the accused needed to be balanced with, among other factors, 
consideration of the nature of collecting gender-based evidence, the impact 
of denial of the amendments to victims’ access to justice, resulting 
impunity for gender-based crimes, and the Special Court’s overall mandate 
to prosecute gender-based crimes.  These factors are not only important for 
the CDF’s specific indictment amendment decision, but for any occasion 
on which gender-based crimes are considered within international criminal 
justice proceedings. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has outlined three lessons that can be drawn from the AFRC 
and CDF cases, and their trial and appeals judgments, at the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone.  Part of the first lesson is that gendered crimes may be 
multilayered and complex.  An excellent example of such a crime is forced 
marriage.  In the AFRC trial judgment, a majority of the judges held that 
forced marriage is subsumed by the crime of sexual slavery, but the 
Appeals Chamber subsequently concluded that this is an overly simplistic, 
and incorrect, understanding of the crime.120  According to the Appeals 
Chamber, forced marriage should be defined not by the sexual and non-
sexual acts that are indicators of the crime, but as forced conjugal 
association resulting in severe suffering, or physical, mental, or 
psychological injury to the victim.121  Another interlinked notion (and the 
final part of the first lesson) is that seemingly gender-neutral crimes, such 
as the war crime of cruel treatment or the crime against humanity of other 
inhumane acts may contain gendered elements.  The Appeals Chamber has 
commented, in both the AFRC and CDF appeals judgments, that acts of 
gender-based violence can be used to prove such crimes.122 
The second lesson to be gleaned from the Special Court’s judgments is 
related to evidence.  In the CDF case, a majority of the Trial Chamber 
failed to consider the difficulties often associated with collecting evidence 
of gender-based violence, and the specific difficulties in this respect related 
to ongoing strong support of the CDF.123  One of the majority judges even 
implied that that evidence of gender-based violations is inherently more 
prejudicial than other kinds of evidence.124  As a result, the majority 
rejected the Prosecutor’s request, first, to amend the joint indictment to 
include certain gender-based crimes and, second, to consider evidence of 
gender-based acts as proof of other crimes.125  The result was the exclusion 
of consideration of gender-based crimes in the CDF trial judgment and, 
                                                           
 120. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 195. 
 121. Id. ¶ 196. 
 122. Id. ¶¶ 184-186. 
 123. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Reasoned Majority Decision on 
Prosecution Motion for a Ruling on the Admissibility of Evidence, ¶ 65 (Itoe, J., 
concurring). 
 124. Id. ¶ 4. 
 125. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. 
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consequently, silence within the Special Court’s record of CDF crimes.126  
These mistakes by the Trial Chamber majority should never be repeated 
within the Special Court or any other institution tasked with implementing 
international criminal law. 
The final lesson also stems from the CDF case and relates to how the 
Court’s mandate to address gender-based crimes is connected with the 
rights of the accused.  In the CDF case, when making the decisions to deny 
the Prosecutor’s requests to amend the indictment to add gender-based 
crimes and to consider acts of gender-based violence as proof of other 
crimes, the majority of the Trial Chamber failed to consider, alongside the 
defendants’ rights, the Prosecutor and Court’s obligations with respect to 
gender-based crimes.  They should have examined, inter alia, whether 
denial of the amendments would impede the Special Court’s fulfillment of 
its mandate and whether victims would be denied proper access to justice. 
These three lessons, which in some respects are particular to the Special 
Court’s AFRC and CDF cases, are in other respects also relevant to the 
Charles Taylor and RUF cases currently before the Special Court, and to 
the future work of the International Criminal Court.127  All international or 
internationalized tribunals should ensure that gender-based crimes are 
understood not only as crimes of rape, but also as crimes targeted at 
individuals because of socially-constructed understandings of their sex.  
Furthermore, those working within tribunals should understand that acts of 
gender-based violence can be used to prove a variety of crimes and should 
not only be confined to proving sexual crimes.  Evidence of gender-based 
crimes should be dealt with sensitively, with an understanding of any 
difficulties related to evidence collection, and without assumptions that it 
may be more prejudicial to the case of an accused than other evidence.  
Finally, in weighing the rights of the accused, judges must also ask if there 
are other relevant factors that should be considered, such as the access of 
victims to justice or the overall mandate of the tribunal. 
 
                                                           
 126. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 446. 
 127. See generally Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I-75, Amended 
Indictment (Mar. 17, 2006) (charging Taylor with the crimes against humanity of rape 
and sexual slavery and the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity). 
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